

## Message Text

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PARM, UR, US

SUBJECT: ANNUAL POLICY ASSESSMENT: USSR

1. THE U.S. INTEREST: THE SOVIET UNION DOMINATES THE WORLD'S LARGEST CONTINENTAL LANDMASS, HAS TREMENDOUS MILITARY POWER AND THE WORLD'S MOST EXTENSIVE RESERVES OF NATURAL RESOURCES AT ITS DISPOSAL, AND IS GOVERNED DICTATORIALLY BY A REGIME CONTINUALLY ENCOURAGED BY ITS STATE INTERESTS AND ITS MILITANT IDEOLOGY TO EXPAND SOVIET POWER AND INFLUENCE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. IN ADDITION TO ITS STRATEGIC WEAPONRY AND POTENT CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE AND ASIA, THE USSR POSSESSES A RELATIVELY NEW CAPACITY TO MOVE SUBSTANTIAL FORCES BY AIR AND SEA TO ANY POINT ON THE PLANET. THIS CAPACITY WILL BE APPROACHING PARITY WITH OURS DURING THE NEXT DECADE. GIVEN THESE FACTS, THE U.S. - SOVIET RELATIONSHIP CONTINUES TO BE THE MOST IMPORTANT ONE WE HAVE. NEGLECT, IN THE SENSE OF INATTENTION, CANNOT BE BENIGN. THE UNITED STATES HAS NO MORE VITAL NATIONAL INTEREST THAN TO PUT ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON A MORE STABLE BASIS FOR THE FUTURE, BY CHECKING SOVIET POWER WHERE WE CAN AND MUST, AND BY CHANNELLING IT INTO MORE RESPONSIBLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE INTERNATIONAL APPLICATIONS.

2. FUNDAMENTAL U.S. POLICY OBJECTIVES:

-- TO AVOID, AND REDUCE THE RISK OF, NUCLEAR WAR;

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-- TO REDUCE THE RISK OF A SLIDE INTO CONFRONTATION WITH THE

USSR, ESPECIALLY OVER DISPUTES ARISING OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF ALLIANCE OBLIGATIONS ON EACH SIDE; AND TO DEVELOP AND ENCOURAGE, IN THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AND OUTSIDE IT, PATTERNS OF SOVIET BEHAVIOR WHICH ARE CONSTRUCTIVE IN THE SHORT TERM, DIFFICULT TO REVERSE IN THE MIDDLE TERM, AND EXPRESSIVE OF A NEW, RESPONSIBLE WORLD ROLE FOR THE SOVIET STATE OVER THE LONG TERM.

3. OPERATIONS U.S. POLICY OBJECTIVES:

-- TO PRESS AHEAD WITH THE SOVIETS TOWARD CLEAR, REALISTIC AND EFFECTIVE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, TO THE LIMIT OF POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES, BEGINNING WITH SALT;

-- IN THIS CONNECTION, TO CONVEY UNAMBIGUOUSLY AND CONVINCINGLY TO THE SOVIETS THAT THEIR RECENT CONDUCT IN ANGOLA AND IN SEVERAL BILATERAL AREAS IS UNACCEPTABLE TO US, AND DANGEROUS TO THE FUTURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP;

-- TO FOSTER THE MAINTENANCE OF MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL TIES COMPATIBLE WITH U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS, IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN THE SOVIET DESIRE FOR AND STAKE IN POSITIVE BILATERAL RELATIONS;

-- TO FOSTER THE PATTERNS OF LONG-TERM BILATERAL COOPERATION AND CONTACT IN THE ECONOMIC, SCIENTIFIC/TECHNICAL, POLITICAL, INFORMATIONAL, CULTURAL AND OTHER FIELDS WHICH HAVE BEGUN TO TAKE SHAPE IN RECENT YEARS;

-- TO ENCOURAGE SOVIET OBSERVANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS, IN ORDER TO ADVANCE BASIC HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES AND TO MAKE THE USSR A MORE NORMAL MEMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND A MORE DEPENDABLE PARTNER FOR THE UNITED STATES;

-- TO BUILD SOVIET INCENTIVES TO COOPERATE RESPONSIBLY IN EFFORTS TO OVERCOME SUCH INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS AS FOOD, POPULATION GROWTH, RESOURCES ALLOCATION AND POLLUTION CONTROL, AS WELL AS ARMS CONTROL AND ARMS REDUCTION.

4. SOVIET OBJECTIVES:

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-- TO AVOID WAR, MOVE AHEAD IN THE DISARMAMENT FIELD, PARTICULARLY IN SALT, AND ULTIMATELY TO REDUCE ARMS EXPENDITURES, BUT AT THE SAME TIME TO ENHANCE SOVIET POWER AND PRESTIGE IN EVERY PART OF THE WORLD THROUGH A STEADY GROWTH OF MILITARY STRENGTH;

-- TO ENHANCE THE SOVIET POSITION BOTH IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT AND IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, PARTICULARLY VIS-A-VIS CHINA;

-- IN EASTERN EUROPE, TO CONSOLIDATE THE SOVIET ALLIANCE SYSTEM  
AND TO MAINTAIN ITS COHESION, WITH EMPHASIS ON ECONOMIC "INTEGRATION;  
"

-- TO NEUTRALIZE NATO MILITARY AND POLITICAL STRENGTH AND PRES-  
TIGE IN WESTERN EUROPE;

-- WORLDWIDE, TO INCREASE SOVIET INFLUENCE, AND ACHIEVE RECOG-  
NITION OF THE USSR AS AN AUTHENTIC AND LEGITIMATE GLOBAL GREAT  
POWER;

-- TO SPEED THE PACE OF SOVIET ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT THROUGH  
INTRODUCTION OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES AND THROUGH  
MACHINERY AND TECHNOLOGY IMPORTS FINANCED BY WESTERN CREDITS; AND

-- TO IMPROVE SOVIET DOMESTIC LIVING STANDARDS AND OFFSET LOW  
LABOR PRODUCTIVITY, HOPEFULLY THROUGH SELF-GENERATED EMPHASIS ON  
QUALITY PRODUCTION AS WELL AS THROUGH IMPORTS OF HIGHLY AUTOMATED  
CAPITAL GOODS FOR THE INDUSTRIAL AND CONSUMER SECTORS OF THE  
DOMESTIC ECONOMY, ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT BASIC POLITICAL ARRANGE-  
MENTS MUST NOT BE FUNDAMENTALLY ALTERED THEREBY.

#### 5. INTERFACE: THE PROBLEM FOR 1976

-- NEITHER THE U.S. NOR THE USSR CAN PURSUE ITS INTERNATIONAL  
OBJECTIVES WITHOUT TAKING THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP INTO ACCOUNT.  
THEY ARE CONDEMNED TO INTERACTION, TO UNFLAGGING EFFORT TO CHECK  
EACH OTHER'S INFLUENCE AND TO CHANNEL IT INTO MORE ACCOMMODATING  
MODES BOTH WHERE IT CAN BE CHECKED AND WHERE IT CANNOT.

-- INTERFACE HAS ALWAYS BEEN DIFFICULT BETWEEN THE THREE-  
PRONGED AMERICAN CONCEPT OF THE RELATIONSHIP'S GOALS -- REDUCING  
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THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR, AVOIDING THIRD-AREA CONFRONTATION, AND  
COOPERATING BILATERALLY TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE -- AND THE SOVIET  
CONCEPT OF "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE" WITH THE ADVANCED DEMOCRACIES.  
THE CHALLENGE AND ACHIEVEMENT OF RECENT YEARS HAS BEEN TO RECOGNIZE  
THE DIFFICULTY AND FIND WAYS TO MOVE BEYOND IT. FINDING PRODUCTIVE  
NEW METHODS TO MANAGE THE RELATIONSHIP HAS BEEN EASIEST (DESPITE  
FORMIDABLE OBSTACLES) IN THOSE AREAS WHERE THE AMERICAN AND SOVIET  
CONCEPTS HAVE OVERLAPPED, I.E. ARMS CONTROL AND BILATERAL COOPERA-  
TION. IT HAS BEEN HARDEST IN THE THIRD WORLD, WHERE THERE HAS BEEN  
A CLEAR CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE DESIRE TO AVOID CONFRONTATION AND  
THE SOVIET COMMITMENT TO SUPPORT "PROGRESSIVE" CHANGE, AND ESPECIALLY  
"NATIONAL LIBERATION" MOVEMENTS, AS DEFINED UNILATERALLY BY THE USSR.

-- OUR MAJOR CURRENT PROBLEM IS TO CONVINCE THE SOVIET LEADER-  
SHIP THAT THE ROOTS OF THE TROUBLES WHICH AFFLICT EAST-WEST

RELATIONS GO DEEPER THAN ELECTORAL POLITICS IN THE U.S., THAT THEY ARE LARGELY OF THE SOVIETS' OWN MAKING, AND THAT THEY NEED NOT BE PERMANENT. THE SOVIETS WILL NOT BE EASY TO CONVINCE, SINCE THE AMERICAN ELECTIONS, WHICH THEY ARE WATCHING CLOSELY, GIVE THEM OVERWHELMING INCENTIVE TO EXPLAIN AWAY EVERY EFFORT IN THIS DIRECTION AS TACTICAL AND DOMESTIC IN ITS ORIGIN. IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT THEY VIEW THEIR ADVENTURE IN ANGOLA AND THE U.S. REACTION TO IT.

6. THE YEAR THAT WAS

-- FROM THE SOVIET POINT OF VIEW, THERE WERE SEVERAL CLEAR AND RINGING VICTORIES IN 1975; VIETNAM, ANGOLA, RISING PRESTIGE IN ASIA AND AFRICA AT BOTH CHINESE AND AMERICAN EXPENSE, RISING TRADE, RISING "INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY," AND THE SYMBOLIC ACHIEVEMENT OF GENERAL ACCEPTANCE OF SOVIET WORLD WAR II GAINS AT CSCE

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AND DURING THE CELEBRATIONS SURROUNDING THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE END OF THAT WAR. THESE VICTORIES REINFORCED THE SOVIET CONVICTION THAT THE "WORLD CORRELATION OF FORCES" IS MOVING IN THEIR DIRECTION, AND THAT THE SOVIET "PEACE PROGRAM" WAS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN BRINGING THIS ABOUT.

-- THE SHORT-TERM PERSPECTIVE, HOWEVER, WAS NOT NEARLY SO SECURE:

(A) ECONOMICALLY, THE CHEERING 1974 OUTLOOK FOR SOVIET SURGE AND CAPITALIST DECLINE CLOUDED OVER. RELATIVE TO THE WEST, THE SOVIET ECONOMY CONTINUED TO ADVANCE, BUT TRADE WITH THE U.S. WAS CONSTRAINED BY THE TRADE /EMIGRATION IMPASSE; WESTERN INFLATION WAS

REFLECTED IN SOVIET INDUSTRIAL IMPORT PRICES; WEAK WESTERN CAPITAL MARKETS TROUBLED EFFORTS TO FLOAT MAJOR HARD-CURRENCY LOANS; WEAK INTERNATIONAL GOLD SALES; AND THE UNPLANNED NEED TO SPEND SOME \$3 BILLION FOR GRAIN DELIVERIES IN 1976-1977 TO OVERCOME THE 1975 HARVEST DISASTER WAS A BLOW IN TERMS OF BOTH ECONOMICS AND INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE.

(B) POLITICALLY, ALTHOUGH THE AMERICAN DEFEAT IN VIETNAM TRANSLATED INTO GAINS FOR THE SOVIET BOTH IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THROUGHOUT THE THIRD WORLD, AND, TOGETHER WITH U.S. DOMESTIC DISARRAY, CAUSED A DROP IN OUR INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE IN SOVIET EYES, AMERICAN ALLIANCES HELD FIRM, AND WASHINGTON'S INFLUENCE, CHECKED IN SOME AREAS, ADVANCED IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

-- IN THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, 1975 WAS A CHECKERED YEAR. AFTER MOVING FROM THE JOLT OF THE TRADE/EMIGRATION IMPASSE TO THE  
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TRIUMPH OF APOLLO-SOYUZ AND THE SEEMING CONCILIATION OF THE HELSINKI SUMMIT, IT THEN WITNESSED THE DASHING OF SOVIET HOPES FOR A SALT AGREEMENT AND A U.S. - SOVIET SUMMIT, AND ENDED WITH THE BITTER U.S. REACTION ON ANGOLA. BY YEAR'S END, THE SOVIETS NO LONGER FACED THE SAME ARRAY OF PENALTIES AND INCENTIVES THAT THE U.S. HAD AT ITS DISPOSAL IN 1972-1973;

(A) THE KIND OF NATIONAL CONFIDENCE IN MILITARY STRENGTH WHICH PERMITS CONFIDENT ENGAGEMENT IN BOTH MILITARY ACTION AND ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATION;

(B) THE RESOURCES AND WILL TO COUNTER SOVIET THREATS WORLDWIDE;

(C) THE ABILITY TO USE ECONOMIC ASSETS AS A POLITICAL TOOL; AND

(D) MOST IMPORTANT, FIRM NATIONAL CONSENSUS ON AT LEAST THE BROAD OUTLINES OF HOW TO MANAGE THE RELATIONSHIP.

#### SOVIET REACTION

-- THE SOVIET POLICY REACTION HAS BEEN TO REAFFIRM THE PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES WHICH GUIDE SOVIET POLICY, MOST COMPREHENSIVELY AT THE 25TH CPSU CONGRESS, BUT TO PURSUE THEM WITH LESS ATTENTION TO U.S. INTERESTS AND CONCERNS. ANGOLA HAS BEEN THE MOST GRAPHIC CASE IN POINT. THE SPECIFIC FACTORS INVOLVED--PORTUGUESE DEBILITY, THE UNWILLINGNESS OF THE U.S. CONGRESS TO BACK THE ADMINISTRATION'S MOVES, THE POWER VACUUM, THE EXISTENCE OF COMPETING AFRICAN GROUPS (INCLUDING LONG-TIME SOVIET FAVORITES) ON THE GROUND, THE ABSENCE OF EXTRA-AFRICA CONSTRAINTS WERE UNIQUE. BUT AT THE SAME TIME IT IS CLEAR THAT THE SOVIETS WILL SEEK TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF LOCAL SITUATIONS TO THE EXTENT THEY CAN, IF CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT AND IF THEY ARE NOT OTHERWISE CONSTRAINED.

-- ONE FACTOR IN THE SOVIET EQUATION--LEADERSHIP-CUM-SUCCESSION PROBLEMS--WILL BE MORE IMPORTANT OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS THAN IT HAS BEEN IN THE PAST YEAR. THE PRESENT LEADERSHIP IS THE OLDEST IN ANY MAJOR GOVERNMENT IN THE WORLD. IT WORKS BY CONSENSUS, AT WHICH BREZHNEV IS A PAST MASTER. WITHIN THAT CONSENSUS THERE ARE VARIETIES AND EVEN DIVERGENCIES OF VIEW ON SPECIFIC ISSUES, BUT THEY DO NOT SEEM TO AFFECT THE BASIC OBJECTIVES OR MAIN LINES OF FOREIGN POLICY MANAGEMENT. SOVIET POLICY MAY HAVE BEEN MORE

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AGGRESSIVE THIS YEAR, BUT THIS AGGRESSIVENESS IS INHERENT IN SOVIET POWER AND IDEOLOGY; IT IS NOT NEW AND IS MORE A FUNCTION OF OPPORTUNITY AND ABSENCE OF CONSTRAINT THAN OF A CONSCIOUS ALTERATION OF PREVIOUS SOVIET POLICIES. THE SHRUNKEN DETENTE LINE ENUNCIATED AT THE CONGRESS SURELY HAS CRITICS, BUT IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THIS CRITICISM EXTENDS TO ESSENTIALS, OR PROMISES SIGNIFICANT VARIATIONS IN THE MONTHS AHEAD. PREPARATIONS FOR A SUCCESSION, WHEN THEY BEGIN, MAY BRING CHANGE. DURING A PERIOD OF LEADERSHIP SUCCESSION MANEUVERING SOVIET POLICY IS LIKELY TO MOVE IN THE DIRECTION OF COMPREHENSIVE HUNKERING DOWN AROUND CONSENSUS POSITIONS, AND REDUCED VENTURESOMENESS IN FOREIGN POLICY. ONCE THE NEW REGIME IS COMFORTABLY INSTALLED, HOWEVER, WE WOULD EXPECT CONSIDERABLE RECEPTIVITY TO RECOMMITMENT TO RELAXATION OF TENSIONS AND RESTABILIZATION OF SUPERPOWER RELATIONS. IT IS THEREFORE OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE TO DEVELOP U.S. POLICY OPTIONS ADEQUATE TO THE DANGERS AND OPPORTUNITIES WHICH CHANGE IN THE USSR WILL PRESENT, AND WE SHOULD BE READY TO OFFER ANY NEWLY-INSTALLED KREMLIN LEADERSHIP A DRAMATIC REAFFIRMATION OF OUR OWN READINESS TO RETURN TO BROAD-GUAGE RELAXATION OF TENSIONS. BUT EVEN PRELIMINARY PREPARATIONS FOR SUCCESSION DOES NOT YET SEEM TO HAVE BEGUN.

#### 7. THE YEAR THAT IS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 1976

-- OUT TASK FOR BOTH THE NEAR TERM AND THE LONG TERM, THEREFORE, IS TO CONVINCE THIS SOVIET LEADERSHIP AND THE ONE THAT WILL SUCCEED IT THAT THE BEST CHANCE OF CONSOLIDATING THE "STABILITY AND CONTINUITY" THE SOVIET TOOK CARE TO DISPLAY AT THEIR 25TH PARTY CONGRESS IS TO RESTORE THE "RELEXATION OF TENSIONS" BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS TO THE LEVELS WHICH EXISTED BEFORE THE SOVIETS REFUSED TO ACQUIESCE IN THE TRADE/EMIGRATION COMPROMISE OF LATE 1974.

THE TRADITIONAL REPERTOIRE: ARMS CONTROL AND SUMMITRY  
SALT

-- ALMOST EVERY SOVIET LEADERSHIP STATEMENT OVER THE PAST EIGHT MONTHS, FROM THE MORROW OF HELSINKI TO ARBATOV'S PRAVDA ARTICLE APRIL2, HAS REAFFIRMED THE COMMITMENT TO FURTHER PROGRESS IN THE ADMITTEDLY "COMPLEX" EFFORT TO CONTROL ARMAMENTS. SALT STILL PROVIDES THE BEST OPPORTUNITY FOR THE SOVIETS TO TRANSLATE WORDS INTO DEEDS. IN THAT SENSE, AS LONG AS WE ARE CONVINCED THAT AN AGREEMENT WHICH IS IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND IS DEFENSIBLE CAN

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BE ACHIEVED, THE EFFORT TO ACHIEVE IT SHOULD BE PUSHED TO THE  
LIMITS OF POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES, IN OUR OWN INTEREST.

-- THE POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES IN SALT ARE NEVERTHELESS MORE  
LIMITED THAN THEY WERE A YEAR AGO. THE OPTIONS WE AND THE SOVIETS  
MAY NOW FACE ARE (1) DEFERRAL OF AGREEMENT, (2) DEFERRAL OF RATI-  
FICATION, AND (3) ASKING THE SOVIETS TO GO THE EXTRA YARD TO GET  
AN AGREEMENT RATIFIABLE BY THE SENATE THIS YEAR. DEFERRING AGREE-  
MENT RUNS THE RISK OF DEFERRING IT FOREVER. MOREOVER, THE CREDI-  
BILITY OF OUR OWN COMMITMENT TO SALT AND TO THE KIND OF RELATION-  
SHIP DEVELOPED IN RECENT YEARS CAN BE PRESERVED ONLY IF WE CAN  
EXPLAIN CONVINCINGLY AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL THAT SALT IS IN TROUBLE  
BECAUSE THE BASIC RELATIONSHIP IS IN TROUBLE, AND THAT THESE  
TROUBLES ARE LIKELY TO CONTINUE UNTIL THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP PER-  
CEIVES THAT THE SHRUNKEN DETENTE WE HAVE ARRIVED AT IS NOT SIMPLY  
AN ELECTION YEAR PHENOMENON, BUT PUTS A PERMANENT MORTGAGE ON THE  
KIND OF BROAD-GUAGE RELATIONSHIP BOTH SIDES SEEK.

THE SUMMIT

-- THE DESIRABILITY OF A LINKAGE BETWEEN SALT 11 AND A WASHING-  
TON SUMMIT, WHICH BREZHNEV OBVIOUSLY WANTS, HAS BECOME OPEN TO  
QUESTION. THE ACTIVE RELATIONSHIP HAS NOW SHRUNK TO THE POINT  
WHERE WE MIGHT WELL CONSIDER DECOUPLING THIS SALT/WASHINGTON LINK-  
AGE. INSTEAD, WE MIGHT CONSIDER A WORKING SUMMIT OUTSIDE WASH-  
INGTON ON THE MODEL OF THE VLADIVOSTOK MEETING, PERHAPS IN ALASKA,  
DURING WHICH THE FINAL DETAILS OF A SALT ACCORD COULD BE WORKED  
OUT. AT THAT TIME WE COULD ALSO MAKE UNMISTAKABLY CLEAR TO THE  
SOVIETS THAT THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC SEE A RADICAL  
CONTRADICTION BETWEEN UNLIMITED SOVIET COMMITMENT TO SUPPORT WHAT

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THEY DEFINE AS "PROGRESSIVE" CHANGE AND "NATIONAL LIBERATION" MOVEMENTS, AS PRACTICED IN ANGOLA, AND THE BASIC PRINCIPLES GOVERNING MUTUAL RELATIONS WHICH THE TWO SIDES AGREED TO IN 1972 AND 1973, ESPECIALLY NON-PURSUIT OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE AND PRIOR CONSULTATION.

-- WHETHER OR NOT WE DECIDE ON SUCH A PRELIMINARY WORKING SUMMIT, WE SHOULD SEEK TO CONVEY THE FOLLOWING POINTS TO THE SOVIETS THIS YEAR AT ALL APPROPRIATE LEVELS:

(A) THESE PRINCIPLES HAVE LUBRICATED THE DIFFICULT CONCEPTUAL INTERFACE OF THE RELATIONSHIP SINCE OUR NEW COURSE WAS MAPPED OUT, AND SOVIET PRACTICE OVER THE PAST YEAR HAS HAD THE EFFECT, IT NOT THE INTENTION, OF REDEFINING THEM TO SOVIET ADVANTAGE.

(B) IF THE SOVIETS INSIST THAT REDEFINITION OF PRINCIPLES IS PERMITTED BY THE UNDERSTANDING WE HAVE REACHED, THEY DO SO AT MAJOR AND PERHAPS PROHIBITIVE COST TO THE FUTURE OF BOTH COUNTRIES AND THE WORLD.

(C) IF THEY INSIST ON PROMOTING SHIFTS IN THE "WORLD CORRELATION OF FORCES" IN THEIR FAVOR, THEY MUST EXPECT THE UNITED STATES, UNDER ANY LEADERSHIP, TO RESPOND APPROPRIATELY, BOTH IN THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AND OUTSIDE IT.

(D) IN ANY CASE, THE USE OF CUBANS OR OTHER THIRD PARTIES TO ACHIEVE SOVIET ENDS IF FLATLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE UNITED STATES, WHICH MUST INSIST ON HOLDING THE SOVIETS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE

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ACTIVITIES OF THEIR SURROGATES.

(E) WE NEED, BY ALL MEANS, TO MOVE FORWARD TOGETHER IN EVERY AREA WE CAN, AND SALT IS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT. PRECISELY FOR THIS REASON, HOWEVER, THE DIFFICULTIES IN SALT ARE INDICATIVE OF THE DANGERS FACING THE RELATIONSHIP ACROSS THE SPECTRUM.

MBFR

-- THE PACE OF MBFR SHOULD BE DETERMINED BY THE PROGRESS THAT CAN BE MADE ON THE ISSUES. THE ALTERNATIVES -- A TOKEN AGREEMENT OR AN INDEFINITE RECESS -- WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY ENDANGER THE VIABILITY OF A USEFUL NEGOTIATING PROCESS. THE EXISTENCE OF THE PROCESS HAS ALREADY SERVED TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON THE REAL ISSUES



OF MANAGING THE REGIONAL BALANCE IN EUROPE. THESE ISSUES ARE COMPLEX, AND THEIR "POLITICAL SHAPE" CHANGES OVER TIME. WHAT BEGAN AS AN EFFORT TO AVOID U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWALS IN EUROPE AND CORRECT THE CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE MAY NOW BE SLIDING TOWARD NEGOTIATION ON THE SPREADING NO-MAN'S-LAND BETWEEN "TACTICAL" AND "STRATEGIC WEAPONS". MBFR MUST DEAL IN SOME FASHION WITH WEAPONS SYSTEMS NOT TREATED IN SALT, AND IT PROVIDES A FRAMEWORK IN WHICH THE SUPERPOWERS AND THEIR ALLIES CAN BEGIN TO GRAPPLE, AT LEAST INITIALLY, WITH THE LARGER PROBLEMS WHICH ARISE WHEN THE FIREBREAK BETWEEN NUCLEAR AND NON-NUCLEAR BEGINS TO BREAK DOWN AS A RESULT OF TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT. TO PUT THE MBFR PROCESS AT RISK BECAUSE THESE ISSUES ARE EMBRYONIC AND DIFFICULT MAKES NO MORE SENSE THAN TO PUT THE SALT PROCESS AT RISK BECAUSE IT MUST DEAL WITH QUALITATIVE AS WELL AS QUANTITATIVE COMPETITION IN STRATEGIC WEAPONRY. IN THE SHORT TERM, FURTHERMORE, CONTINUATION OF MBFR WOULD BE A BETTER ANTIDOTE TO SALT STANDSTILL, IN TERMS OF MAINTAINING THE ARMS CONTROL DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIETS, THAN THE CONFESSION OF FAILURE IMPLICIT TO TOKENISM OR RECESS. MBFR SHOULD THEREFORE FLOAT ON ITS OWN BOTTOM THIS YEAR.

#### BEYOND SALT AND MBFR

-- PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS IN OTHER ARMS CONTROL FIELDS, INCLUDING STRATEGIC REDUCTIONS AND LIMITS ON NEW SYSTEMS, DEPEND HEAVILY ON PROGRESS WITHIN SALT AND MBFR, BOTH SUBSTANTIVELY AND POLITICALLY. THE SOVIETS CAN BE EXPECTED TO PRESS FORWARD MORE OR LESS CONSISTENTLY WITH THEIR CATALOGUE OF ARMS CONTROL "INITIATIVES," BEGINNING

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WITH PROHIBITION OF NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND THE WORLD NON-USE OF FORCE TREATY. ONCE WE HAVE THE RESULTS OF SALT AND MBFR IN HAND, IT WILL BE TIME TO TAKE A CLOSER LOOK AT POSSIBILITIES IN SOME OF THESE AREAS, IN LIGHT OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST. THE ARGUMENT FOR PROCEEDING TO REDUCE EXISTING SYSTEMS OR TO LIMIT NEW SYSTEMS WILL BE STRONGER IF WE CAN MAKE A START, IN SALT, IN MANAGING THE QUALITATIVE COMPETITION. AT THE BOTTOM LINE, HOWEVER, THE ARMS CONTROL DIALOGUE IS NOT LIKELY TO ACHIEVE RESULTS WHEN IT DEALS WITH EXISTING SYSTEMS, AS IN SALT, OR WITH REGIONAL BALANCES, AS IN MBFR. EXAMINING POSSIBILITIES FOR NEXT STEPS IN ARMS CONTROL IS NOT AN URGENT TASK IN 1976.

#### THE TRADITIONAL REPERTOIRE: ARMED STRENGTH

-- ON THE THE BEST OF THE FRE LEVERS AVAILABLE TO US IN THE YEAR OF ANGOLA IS A STRONG DEFENSE 75&35 285# -N UPWARD TREND. IT IS NOT A LEVER THAT CAN BE DIRECTLY APPLIED IN THE BILATERAL DIALOGUE, BUT, INDIRECTLY APPLIED, IT IS AN ARGUMENT FOR CONSTRUCTIVE SOVIET BEHAVIOR TO WHICH THE SOVIETS THEMSELVES ARE SENSITIVE. AT EVERY LEVEL OF THE DIALOGUE, THEREFORE, WE SHOULD BE MAKING THE POINT THAT SOVIET PROMOTION OF FAVORABLE CHANGES IN THE "WORLD CORRELATION FOR FORCES", GLOBALLY OR WITHIN REGIONS, WILL

INEVITABLY, UNDER ANY ADMINISTRATION, CALL FORTH INCREASED U.S. MILITARY BUDGETS. THIS POINT IS NOT A THREAT, BUT A FACT OF LIFE, WHICH WE AND THE SOVIETS MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT AS WE SEEK TO RELAX TENSIONS AND BUILD FOR THE FUTURE.

#### THE TRADITIONAL REPERTOIRE: BILATERAL RELATIONS

-- IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE GET ACROSS TO THE SOVIETS THAT ARMS CONTROL IS NOT ENOUGH, AND THAT IF MOMENTUM IS RESTRICTED TO THE ARMS CONTROL FIELD, ARMS CONTROL PROGRESS IS ALSO IN DANGER. TO DEMONSTRATE THIS POINT, WE MUST BE BOTH CAREFUL AND CREATIVE THIS YEAR ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF THE RELATIONSHIP.

#### TRADE/ECONOMIC RELATIONS

-- ON THE TRADE/ECONOMIC SIDE, ENGAGEMENT WITH THE SOVIETS, AND STRENGTHENING THE PATTERN OF LONG-TERM BILATERAL COOPERATION, CLEARLY REMAINS VALID GOALS. THEY MAINTAIN SOVIET INCENTIVES FOR A POSITIVE RELATIONSHIP; THEY CREATE FISSURES IN SOVIET ECONOMIC

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AUTARKY AND IN THE CLOSED SOVIET SOCIETY WHICH ARE HARD TO REPAIR; AND THEY CAN BE ECONOMICALLY ADVANTAGEOUS TO US.

-- THE PROBLEM IN 1976 IS WHETHER OR NOT TO PURSUE THESE GOALS ACTIVELY IN A YEAR WHEN POLITICAL RELATIONS ARE COOLING. WITH U.S. OPTIONS CIRCUMSCRIBED, AND THE SOURING OF THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE LIKELY TO PRODUCE A MORE RESERVED ATTITUDE TOWARD SOVIET TRADE IN THE AMERICAN BUSINESS COMMUNITY, THERE IS LITTLE THE USG CAN DO TO HALT THIS TREND, AND DOING LITTLE IS PROBABLY THE PROPER POLICY FOR THE BALANCE OF 1976, OR UNTIL THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE IMPROVES. THE SIGNAL WILL BE NEGATIVE, BUT ALSO RATHER WEAK: IT WILL NOT IMPROVE SOVIET BEHAVIOR OVER THE SHORT TERM, BUT THE SOVIET INCENTIVE TO CONTINUE IS STRONG ENOUGH TO PREVENT THE SLOWDOWN FROM DAMAGING THE OVERALL RELATIONSHIP, AND THE SIGNAL SHOULD SERVE TO REMIND THE SOVIETS OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF PROTRACTED POOR BEHAVIOR.

-- ALTHOUGH NOT MUCH CONCRETE CAN BE ACHIEVED THIS YEAR, WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES FOR CREATING NEW MACHINERY TO FACILITATE BILATERAL TRADE GROWTH IN THE FUTURE AND TO PROTECT THE INTERESTS OF AMERICAN FIRMS CONFRONTING MONOPOLY STATE TRADING ORGANIZATIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON POOLING OF AIRLINE REVENUES BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS' DESIGNATED CARRIERS, PAN AMERICAN AND AEROFLOT.

-- THE SLOWDOWN SHOULD ALSO PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO IDENTIFY SOVIET DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENT GOALS WHICH CAN SERVE OUR PURPOSES OF (1) OBTAINING A SHARE OF SOVIET OIL AND/OR OTHER ENERGY SOURCES ON FAVORABLE CONDITIONS AND (2) BUILDING NEW INCENTIVES FOR IMPROVED

SOVIET RESPONSIVENESS TO U.S. INTERESTS INTERNATIONALLY. SOVIET PRIORITIES SHOULD HIGHLIGHT PROJECTS IN THE ENERGY, CHEMICAL, AND TRANSPORT AREAS WHEN THE 1976-1980 FIVE YEAR PLAN IS REVEALED IN DETAIL IN SEPTEMBER. OFFSHORE OIL/GAS DRILLING OPERATIONS AND

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SECONDARY/TERTIARY OIL RECOVERY TECHNIQUES COULD WELL EMERGE AS HIGH-PRIORITY PROJECTS IN THE ENERGY FIELD. IN THE LONGER TERM, IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT U.S. FIRMS CAN ACHIEVE TERMS OF COOPERATION WHICH ARE ADVANTAGEOUS NOT ONLY FROM THE BUSINESS POINT OF VIEW BUT FROM THE POLICY POINT OF VIEW AS WELL. IN THE INTERIM, WE SHOULD BE MAKING THE POINT THAT LARGE-SCALE U.S. PARTICIPATION IN SUCH ENDEAVORS MUST DEPEND IN SOME DEGREE ON THE APPROPRIATE POLITICAL CONTEXT.

BILATERAL COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY --IN THIS AREA, WE SHOULD USE THIS YEAR TO RESHAPE THE NETWORK THE BETTER TO MAINTAIN IT AND EXTEND IT, TO MUTUAL ADVANTAGE, IN THE FUTURE. BECAUSE OF THE LONG LEAD TIME BETWEEN INITIATION AND PAYOFF, THIS NETWORK IS AT ONCE THE MOST TEMPTING TARGET FOR REPRI-SALS AND THE MOST FINELY-SPUN AND VULNERABLE OF THE RELATIONSHIP'S COMPONENTS. NO AREA IS MORE IN NEED OF HIGH-LEVEL SPONSORSHIP, AND IN NO AREA IS THERE A MORE CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER OF A DOWNWARD SPIRAL. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS REMAIN INTERESTED, COOPERATION IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IS UNDER CLOSE SCRUTINY AND EVEN ATTACK IN THE U.S. BEFORE SUFFICIENT TIME HAS ELAPSED TO ALLOW IT TO BEAR FRUIT. GIVEN THE NEED TO INVOLVE BOTH U.S. AND SOVIET LEAD AGENCIES AND HIGHLY QUALIFIED AMERICAN SCIENTISTS AND TECHNOLOGISTS IN HIGH PAYOFF PROJECTS ON A CONTINUING BASIS, OUR RESPONSE SHOULD BE TO RECAST PROGRAMS WHILE REAFFIRMING COMMITMENT TO THE TOTAL EFFORT, RATHER THAN ALLOWING IT TO LAPSE.

--THE FIRST STEP SHOULD BE A CRITICAL TECHNICAL REVIEW, PRECEDED BY INFORMATION SYMPOSIA FOR WORKING GROUP CHAIRMEN AND FOLLOWED BY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SCALEDOWN OR NEW INITIATIVES IN SPECIFIC AREAS. THIS PROCESS SHOULD PROJECT THE IMAGE OF WELL-

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INTENTIONED BUT HARDBOILED PARTNERSHIP, IN WHICH WE TAKE OUR OWN INTERESTS AND THOSE OF OUR ALLIES INTO ACCOUNT.

--FOR EXAMPLE, REVIEWERS MIGHT WISH TO CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING:

-\*REDUCTING THE NUMBER OF ELECTRIC POWER 08.02 SUBGROUP THEMES FROM TEN TO PERHAPS FIVE UNDER THE ENERGY AGREEMENT:

---DROPPING THE MARINE EVIRONMENT 02.06 GROUP UNDER THE ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENT, BECAUSE OF RECENT COMPLICATIONS; AND

---PRUNING CIVIL AVIATION 05.04 UNDER THE TRANSPORTATION AGREEMENT.

--BEYOND CURRENTLY BENEFICIAL MEDICAL, EARTHQUAKE AND MHU PROJECTS MORE STRESS SHOULD BE GIVEN TO POTENTIAL BENEFITS FOR THE U.S. IN AREAS SUCH AS SCIENCE POLICY (01.09), ENERGY INFORMATION AND FORECASTING (08.01) AND OTHER ECONOMIC AND MANAGEMENT STUDY GROUPS, WHERE THE POTENTIAL PAYOFF INCLUDES INSIGHTS INTO SOVIET DOMESTIC PRIORITIES AND PROBLEMS, BUT ALSO INTO SOVIET THIRD-COUNTRY S&T EXPANSIONISM. JOINT STUDY AND EXCHANGE ON TRANSLATING S&T RESULTS FROM THE LABORATORY TO THE PRODUCTION LINE, ONE OF THE TOUGHEST REAL-LIFE PROBLEMS THE SOVIETS FACE, IS AN EXAMPLE.

--TOTALLY NEW PROJECTS SHOULD BE LIMITED TO HIGH-VISIBILITY HUMANITARIAN ENDEAVORS THAT WILL ENGAGE THE US PRIVATE SECTOR IN A MORE EQUAL PARTNERSHIP WITH THE SOVIETS. AN EXAMPLE WOULD BE JOINT RESEARCH ON AND MANUFACTURE OF EQUIPMENT FOR THE HANDICAPPED.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND CULTURE, EDUCATION AND INFORMATION

--CULTURAL, EDUCATIONAL AND INFORMATION PROGRAMS, ON THE ONE HAND, AND HUMANITARIAN ISSUES AND CSCE, ON THE OTHER, SHOULD BE SEEN AS INTEGRAL COMPONENTS OF THE LONG-RANGE STRATEGIC EFFORT TO MAKE THE USSR A MORE RESPONSIBLE AND STABLE PARTICIPANT IN WORLD AFFAIRS. MOST OFTEN, THE PAYOFF IS AT THE FAR END OF THE TIME SCALE, BUT EVEN AT THE NEAR END THERE IS NO BETTER INDICATOR OF PROGRESS AND NO BETTER GUARANTEE OF ULTIMATE "SUCCESS" FOR THE POLICY OF PUTTING US-SOVIET RELATIONS ON A MORE STABLE BASIS THAN THE SLOW OPENING OF THEIR CLOSED SOCIETY TO LEGITIMATE OUTSIDE INFLUENCE THROUGH EXPANDING CONTACTS WITH OTHER SOCIETIES. DESPITE THE SOVIET PREFERENCE FOR CONTACTS WHICH THE SOVIET STATE CAN CONTROL OVER PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE CONTACTS WHICH THREATEN CONTINUALLY TO ESCAPE THAT CONTROL, BOTH KINDS OF CONTACTS SERVE THE INDISPENSABLE GOAL OF OPENING UP SOVIET SOCIETY. EVERY STEP IN THIS DIRECTION IS A NET PLUS FOR US. WE

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SHOULD CONTINUE TO GIVE EQUAL TIME AND EQUAL STRESS TO BOTH CULTURE/EDUCATION/INFORMATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS, INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE CSCE FRAMEWORK.

--CURRENTLY, CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL RELATIONS ARE DEVELOPING WELL, WITH SOVIET RECEPTIVITY OUTRUNNING OUR RESOURCES. THESE PROGRAMS ARE DESIGNED BOTH TO DEEPEN REALISTIC UNDERSTANDING OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY AMONG THOSE WHO INFLUENCE SOVIET DECISIONS, AND TO PROVIDE A FUNDAMENTAL RESOURCE FOR AMERICANS SEEKING TO IMPROVE THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF THE USSR. WE SHOULD SEEK ACTIVELY TO PUSH OUT THE BUDGETARY LIMITS ON OUR CAPACITY TO EXPLOIT SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO EXPAND, AND TO TAP US PRIVATE RESOURCES WHEREVER POSSIBLE TO THE SAME END.

--IN THE INFORMATION FIELD, THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION OPERATE WITH DIFFERENT CONCEPTS AND GOALS, AND WE ARE STILL FAR FROM ANY "FREE" FLOW OF INFORMATION. HERE, TOO, HOWEVER, ENOUGH INTERFACE EXISTS TO SUPPORT EXCHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT, AND OUR INFORMATION EFFORT DESERVES STEADY PROMOTION IN THE SERVICE OF THE BROAD US POLICY GOALS OF REDUCING THE RISK OF CONFRONTATION, ENCOURAGING MORE RESPONSIBLE SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR AND IMPROVING SOVIET PERFORMANCE IN CULTURE AND HUMAN RIGHTS OVER THE LONG RUN. THEY ARE SERVED BOTH BY DIRECT EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION THROUGH OFFICIAL CONTACTS AND BY BROADER PROGRAMS (SUCH AS US EXHIBITS, AMERIKA MAGAZINE, LECTURERS, AND MATERIALS FOR RADIO-TV). PROGRESS TOWARD GENERAL GOALS IN THIS FIELD, IN THE CSCE IMPLEMENTATION CONTEXT AND OUTSIDE IT, WILL BE A FUNCTION OF CONSISTENT ATTENTION TO EXPANDING SPECIFIC BILATERAL INFORMATION CONTACTS AND PROGRAMS.

--ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE SOVIET RECORD CONTINUES TO BE APPALLING, AND WE SHOULD MAKE AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR PROGRESS IN THIS AREA A NORMAL FEATURE OF THE DIALOGUE AT EVERY LEVEL. THE BILATERAL CSCE IMPLEMENTATION DISCUSSIONS WE HAVE INITIATED WITH THE SOVIETS SHOULD BE PURSUED, WITH UNFLAGGING STRESS ON FAMILY REUNIFICATION AND OUR REP LISTS, AND WE SHOULD USE HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS AS OPPORTUNITIES TO MAINTAIN PRESSURE FOR IMPROVED SOVIET PERFORMANCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS.

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AGAIN OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS, WE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS IS INTEGRAL TO OUR SOCIETY, THAT IT IS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, OF POLICY AND NOT OF RHETORIC, AND THAT IT IS A COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE SOVIET UNION AS WELL AS IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE REST OF THE WORLD. THE SOVIETS UNDERSTAND PRINCIPLE, AND CSCE GIVES US BETTER FORMAL GROUNDS THAN BEFORE TO AFFIRM IT TO THE WORLD. STEADY AFFIRMATION WILL SERVE THE DUAL

PURPOSE OF IMPRESSING THE STRENGTH OF OUR COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS ON BOTH THE SOVIETS AND AMERICAN OPINION.  
DIPLOMATIC WORKING CONDITIONS  
--BILATERAL NUTS-AND-BOLTS ISSUES--RADIATION, CHANCERY CONSTRUCTION, PROTECTION OF SOVIET (AND QUITE POSSIBLY AMERICAN) DIPLOMATS--HAVE ALREADY GONE BEYOND "HOUSEKEEPING" THIS YEAR, AND THREATEN TO PENETRATE AND CORRODE THE FABRIC OF THE WHOLE RELATIONSHIP.  
--WE MUST MAKE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THAT THE BOMBARDMENT OF EMBASSY MOSCOW BY DIRECTED BEAMS OF MICROW

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BE GRAVE, AND PERHAPS INCALCULABLE.  
--THE ROLE OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIONS IS CENTRAL TO THE FURTHER IMPROVEMENT OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING BOTH SIDES SEEK, AND EMBASSY MOSCOW IS NOW STRETCHED TO THE LIMIT OF ITS CAPACITY TO CONTRIBUTE BY DIFFICULTIES IMPOSED BY THE SOVIETS, WHO HAVE BEEN UNWILLING DESPITE REPEATED PRODDING TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE HOUSING, STORAGE SPACE, ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY AND EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES. MOSCOW RESOURCE PROBLEMS SHOULD BE SITUATED IN THE BROADER PERSPECTIVE OF THE RELATIONSHIP, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SOVIET OBLIGATION TO ASSURE CONDITIONS FOR THE PROPER FUNCTIONING OF OUR MISSION IN THE USSR.  
--FOR OUR PART, WE SHOULD TAKE EVERY STEP WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE LAW TO PUT A STOP TO THE HARASSMENT AND THREATS TO SOVIET PERSONNEL IN THE UNITED STATES, AND EXPECIALLY IN NEW YORK CITY, ON THE SAME GROUNDS: AS AN INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATION. IN PARTICULAR, WE SHOULD SEE TO IT THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE NO BASIS FOR COMPLAINING THAT THE PROTECTION AFFORDED THEM, AS REPRESENTATIVES OF A FOREIGN COUNTRY, IS LESS COMPLETE THAN THE PROTECTION GIVEN ANY AMERICAN CITIZEN IN US LAW PRACTICE.  
--FINALLY, WE SHOULD DEMONSTRATE OUR COMMITMENT TO FURTHER PROGRESS IN THIS AREA (AND TO FURTHER OPENING OF SOVIET SOCIETY TO CONTACTS WITH AMERICAN) BY MOVING FORWARD TO OPEN IN KIEV, AND TO DISCUSS THE LOCATION OF THE THIRD SET OF CONSULATES GENERAL. EVEN IF KIEV IS NOT FULLY OPERATIONAL IN THE NEAR FUTURE, WE CAN SAVE SOME TIME IN THE NEXT STEP BY INITIATING DISCUSSION OF IT NOW. EXPANDING THE REPERTOIRE: REGIONAL CONTAINMENT.

--THE FACT OF STRATEGIC PARITY BETWEEN THE US AND USSR  
INCREASES THE ROLE OF REGIONAL BALANCES IN MAINTAINING INTER-

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NATIONAL STABILITY, AND CLOSE US ATTENTION TO AND INVOLVEMENT  
IN REGIONAL CONTEXTS IS PROBABLY THE MOST PROMISING APPROACH TO THE  
TASK OF COUNTERING AND CHANNELLING THE GLOBAL REACH OF SOVIET  
POWER.

--PORTUGAL HAS BEEN AN EXCELLENT EXAMPLE. BY TREATING IT AS  
A EUROPEAN PROBLEM AND ACTING AS A CATALYST FOR EUROPEAN OPINION.  
AND BY ACTIVE JOINT SUPPORT FOR NON-COMMUNIST ELEMENTS, WE ENABLED  
THE PORTUGUESE THEMSELVES TO RESERVE THE PRO-COMMUNIST TREND AND  
PUT THEMSELVES ON THE ROAD TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT.

--EAST ASIA IS IN FLUX, BUT THE PROSPECTS FOR US AND  
SOVIET INFLUENCE WILL CLEARLY BE DETERMINED, IN THE FIRST INSTANCE,  
BY REGIONAL FACTORS. WE ARE IN A GOOD POSITION TO IMPROVE OUR  
POSITION THERE, WHILE CONTRIBUTING TO REGIONAL STABILITY AND  
COUNTERING THE SOVIETS: OUR ALLIANCE WITH JAPAN IS FIRM; WE HAVE  
CONVINCINGLY DEMONSTRATED THAT WE MEAN TO STAY INVOLVED IN ASIA;  
VIETNAMESE AND SOVIET STRENGTH CAUSE CONCERN, AS WELL AS ACCOMMODA-  
TION, IN THE AREA; THE CHINESE CLEARLY SEE THE SOVIETS AS THE MAIN  
THREAT; AND THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE PROVIDES A SOLID BASIS FOR  
FORWARD MOVEMENT IN US-PRC RELATIONS WHEN THE TIME COMES. THESE  
ARE NOT FACTORS THAT CAN BE BROUGHT TO BEAR DIRECTLY IN THE US-  
SOVIET RELATIONSHIP; INDEED, THEY SHOULD NOT BE. BUT NO OTHER SET  
OF FACTORS, INCLUDING THE PROSPECTS FOR THE US DEFENSE BUDGET,  
WEIGHS MORE HEAVILY IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY CALCULATIONS.  
PROGRESS IN US-PRC RELATIONS IS THE MOST POWERFUL LEVER WE HAVE  
AT OUR DISPOSAL TO INFLUENCE SOVIET BEHAVIOR, AND, WHILE THE CHEM-  
ISTRY OF TRILATERALISM IS MYSTERIOUS, THE ODDS ARE GOOD THAT PROGRESS  
IN OUR RELATIONS WITH CHINA WILL IMPROVE, RATHER THAN DEGRADE, THE  
US-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP.

--IN THE MIDDLE EAST, IT IS CLEARLY IN OUR INTEREST TO KEEP THE  
PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION TOWARD A STABLE SETTLEMENT IN MOTION THIS  
YEAR, AND AT SOME POINT THE SOVIETS MUST BE BROUGHT INTO THE PRO-  
CESS IF THE SETTLEMENT IS TO BE STABLE. THE SOVIETS ARE TOO NEAR,  
TOO POWERFUL AND TOO INVOLVED TO BE LEFT OUT OF ANY EQUATION WHICH  
WILL GUARANTEE THE ROUGH AREA MILITARY BALANCE ON WHICH ISRAEL'S  
SECURITY WILL ULTIMATELY DEPEND.

--IN EUROPE, THE IDEA OF CHANNELLING SOVIET PRESSURE FOR BASKET-  
II TYPE CONFERENCES (TO THE EXTENT IT CANNOT BE TURNED OFF) INTO  
REGIONAL DISCUSSION, IN THE BALKANS AND THE BALTIC, MERITS PARTIC-  
ULAR ATTENTION. POTENTIALLY, THE BALKANS ARE THE MOST UNSTABLE  
AREA OF THE CONTINENT; THE REGIONAL FRAMEWORK IS QUITE SKETCHY;  
DEVELOPING IT WOULD GIVE SUPPORT TO THE VITAL YUGOSLAV-ROMANIAN

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TIE. IN THE NORTH, POLAND AND EVEN THE GDR COULD SEE DISCUSSION OF

"NON-POLITICAL" TOPICS WITH THE SCANDINAVIANS AS A PATH TO TIES WHICH SUPPLEMENT THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE USSR.

--IN AFRICA, WE SHOULD SEEK TO DEVELOP THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE POSITIONS IN LOCAL AND REGIONAL TERMS. SOUTHERN AFRICA IS THE MOST LIKELY TARGET OF OPPORTUNITY FOR THE SOVIETS IN COMING MONTHS; DISSOCIATION OF THE US FROM THE LOCAL WHITE REGIMES, WHICH IS ALREADY WELL UNDERWAY, IS A PRECONDITION FOR THE SUCCESS OF ANY BLOCKING ACTION; AND WORKING WITH AFRICANS IS THE APPROACH WHICH OFFERS THE BEST CHANCE OF PREVENTING PERMANENT EXTENSION OF SOVIET INFLUENCE.

--IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, WE SHOULD TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT THE POSSIBILITY OF CALLING THE SOVIET BLUFF ON BASES BY MAKING A CLEAR, FORMAL OFFER TO DISCUSS SHIP DEPLOYMENT LIMITATIONS. THIS WOULD GIVE AN EARNEST OF US GOOD INTENTIONS TO THE RIPARIAN STATES; WOULD CONFRONT THEM WITH THE CHOICE BETWEEN PRACTICAL PROGRESS AND CONTINUED INEFFECTUAL BLEATING ABOUT THE ZONE OF PEACE; AND WOULD IDENTIFY THE SOVIETS, IF THEY TURN IT DOWN, AS THE REAL OBSTACLE TO REGIONAL STABILITY.

-- IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, WE SHOULD TAKE EVERY REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO DEMONSTRATE OUR INTENTION TO REMAIN INVOLVED IN THE AREA, AND, IN PARTICULAR, WE SHOULD TAKE A POSITIVE APPROACH TO THE EFFORTS OF ASEAN MEMBERS TO CREATE NOT ONLY CONSTRUCTIVE REGIONAL RELATIONSHIPS, BUT ECONOMICALLY AND POLITICALLY VIABLE AND RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENTS AS WELL.

--COMMUNISM IN WESTERN EUROPE IS ALSO A PROBLEM OF REGIONAL BALANCE, BUT HERE EACH SUPERPOWER HAS ITS OWN DILEMMAS. THE US HAS IDENTIFIED THREE DANGERS IN THE ADVANCE OF WEST EUROPEAN COMMUNISTS TOWARD PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT: THE WEAKENING OF THE WEST EUROPEAN POLITICAL RESOLVE, THE WEAKENING OF AMERICAN PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE TRANSATLANTIC TIE. ALMOST AS CLEARLY, THE SOVIETS HAVE IDENTIFIED IMMEDIATE TWIN THREATS TO THEIR LEADERSHIP OF EUROPEAN COMMUNISM AND THEIR RELATIONS WITH WESTERN GOVERNMENTS; A MEDIUM-TERM THREAT TO THE COHESION OF THEIR EAST EUROPEAN ALLIANCE SYSTEM, AND A LONG-TERM THREAT TO THEIR CREDENTIALS AS A REVOLUTIONARY REGIME. BUT NEITHER SUPERPOWER CAN DO MUCH MORE THAN GRAPPLE WITH ITS OWN DILEMMAS, AND TAKE COLD COMFORT FROM THOSE OF THE OTHER: ANY OTHER COURSE INVOLVES HIGH RISK. THE SOVIETS, FOR THEIR PART, ARE LIABLE TO REACT WITH JAWBONING AND CONTINUATION OF THE EFFORT TO CONSOLIDATE THE SYSTEM IN EASTERN EUROPE, MAINLY THROUGH ECONOMIC MECHANISMS, WHICH HAS BEEN GOING ON SINCE 1968. WE

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SHOULD CONTINUE TO DO WHAT WE CAN TO KEEP EASTERN EUROPE'S OPENING TO THE WEST OPEN, BOTH POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY, AND ENCOURAGE THE WESTERN EUROPEANS TO DO THE SAME. AT THE SAME TIME, THE MAIN BATTLEFIELD WILL REMAIN THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC HEALTH OF OUR WEST EUROPEAN ALLIANCE, AND OF THE TRANSATLANTIC TIE.

EXPANDING THE REPERTOIRE: GLOBAL ISSUES

--BUILDING SOVIET INCENTIVES TO COOPERATE RESPONSIBLY ON GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE ISSUES WILL NOT BE EASY, AND MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED PIECEMEAL. AT PRESENT, THE WORLD FOOD ISSUE REMAINS (75 MOSCOW



7182, 75 MOSCOW 12925) THE ONE INTERDEPENDENCE PROBLEM WHERE US INTERESTS WOULD BE SERVED BY SOVIET PARTICIPATION. AS A GENERAL PROPOSITION, NEVERTHELESS, THE SOVIETS CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO BECOME RESPONSIBLE FOR VIABLE SOLUTIONS TO PRINCIPAL MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGES UNTIL THEY IDENTIFY A NATIONAL INTEREST IN FORMULATING

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SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS THEY SHARE.  
EXPANDING THE REPERTOIRE: CONSULTATIONS ON THIRD AREAS  
--LIKE THE BRITISH AND FRENCH, WE SHOULD EXPAND THE PRACTICE OF REGULAR CONSULTATION WITH THE SOVIETS AT SENIOR WORKING LEVEL ON THE LENGTHENING LIST OF TOPICS OF MUTUAL INTEREST BEYOND THE TRADITIONAL OR ACTIVE AGENDA: UN AFFAIRS, DISARMAMENT, THE MIDDLE EAST, AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, EVEN SOUTH AND EAST ASIA. OFTEN, AT LEAST AT THE OUTSET, SUCH CONSULTATIONS CAN AND SHOULD BE NO MORE THAN A VENTILATION OF CONCERNS AND AN EXCHANGE OF OFFICIAL POSITIONS. AT THE LEAST, HOWEVER, CONSULTATIONS PERMIT BETTER INSIGHT INTO CURRENT SOVIET THINKING, AND, AT BEST, THEY CAN HELP MOVE IT IN CONSTRUCTIVE DIRECTIONS. THEY CAN ALSO BE APPENDED AT SMALL ADDITIONAL COST AND EFFORT TO THE NORMAL TRAVEL SCHEDULES OF ASSISTANT AND DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARIES.

#### 8. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

--IN GENERAL, TO SEEK TO CONVINCE THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP THAT THE CURRENT DIFFICULTIES IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS ARE STRATEGIC, LARGELY OF THEIR OWN MAKING, AND REVERSIBLE.

IN THE TRADITIONAL REPERTOIRE:

--ARMS CONTROL:

---IN SALT, TO PRESS NEGOTIATIONS TO THE LIMIT OF POLITICAL

POSSIBILITIES, BUT, SINCE THE LIMITS HAVE NARROWED, TO CONSIDER  
ABANDONING THE SALT/WASHINGTON SUMMIT LINKAGE IN FORCE UP TO NOW  
IN FAVOR OF A WORKING SUMMIT OUTSIDE WASHINGTON WHERE WE WOULD WORK  
OUT THE FINAL DETAILS OF AN AGREEMENT, BUT ALSO MAKE UNMISTAKABLY  
CLEAR THAT "SHRUNKEN DETENTE," LIMITED TO ARMS CONTROL, ENDANGERS  
THE BROAD-GAUGE RELAXATION OF TENSIONS BOTH SIDES SEEK, AND ARMS  
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CONTROL PROGRESS ITSELF;

---IN MBFR, TO PRESERVE THE PROCESS AND LET IT MOVE AT ITS  
OWN PACE THIS YEAR;

---IN OTHER ARMS CONTROL AREAS, TO AWAIT THE RESULTS OF  
SALT AND MBFR BEFORE WEIGHING THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER REDUCTIONS  
IN EXISTING SYSTEMS OR LIMITING NEW SYSTEMS;

--ARMED STRENGTH: TO MAKE THE POINT AT EVERY LEVEL OF THE  
BILATERAL DIALOGUE THAT CHANGES FAVORABLE TO THE SOVIETS  
IN THE GLOBAL OR REGIONAL BALANCES WILL INEVITABLY LEAD TO  
INCREASED US DEFENSE BUDGETS.

--IN BILATERAL RELATIONS:

---TO GET ACROSS TO THE SOVIETS THAT ARMS CONTROL IS  
NO ENOUGH, AND THAT ARMS CONTROL IS IN DANGER UNLESS PROGRESS  
CONTINUES IN OTHER FIELDS;

---ON THE TRADE/ECONOMIC SIDE, TO ALLOW THE CURRENT LEVEL  
OF RELATIONS TO FREEZE, WHILE EXPLORING POSSIBILITIES FOR NEW  
MACHINERY AND SEEKING TO IDENTIFY HIGH-PRIORITY SOVIET  
PROJECTS, PRIMARILY IN THE ENERGY FIELD, WHICH PROMISE OPPORTUNITIES  
(AND POLICY LEVERS) IN THE FUTURE;

---IN THE AREA OF BILATERAL COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS IN  
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, TO RECAST AND RATIONALIZE THE VULNERABLE  
EXISTING NETWORK THE BETTER TO MAINTAIN AND BUILD ON IT IN THE  
FUTURE, BY PRUNING MARGINAL PROJECTS, INCREASING STRESS ON CERTAIN  
ADVANTAGEOUS PROJECTS, AND INITIATING NEW PROJECTS IN THE HUMANI-  
TARIAN FIELD, THROUGH JOINT EFFORT;

---IN THE CULTURAL INFORMATION AND EDUCATIONAL FIELDS, TO PUSH OUT  
THE BUDGETARY LIMITS ON OUR CAPACITY TO EXPLOIT CURRENT SOVIET  
WILLINGNESS TO EXPAND RELATIONS AND TO TAP US PRIVATE RESOURCES TO  
THE SAME END; TO GIVE STEADY ATTENTION TO EXPANSION OF SPECIFIC  
PROGRAMS AND CONTACTS;

---IN THE RELATED HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD, TO CONTINUE THE BILAT-  
ERAL CSCE IMPLEMENTATION DIALOGUE, WITH STRESS ON FAMILY REUNIFICA-  
TION, TO USE HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS AS OPPORTUNITIES TO MAINTAIN  
PRESSURE FOR IMPROVED SOVIET PERFORMANCE; AND TO PROJECT THE AMER-  
ICAN COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN PUBLIC, AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE.

---ON BILATERAL "HOUSEKEEPING" ISSUES, TO MAKE CLEAR THAT  
MICRO WAVE RADIATION MUST STOP IF GRAVE DAMAGE TO THE WHOLE BILATERAL  
RELATIONSHIP IS TO BE AVOIDED; TO SITUATE EMBASSY MOSCOW RESOURCE  
DIFFICULTIES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SOVIET OBLIGATION TO ASSURE  
CONDITIONS FOR PROPER FUNCTIONING OF OUR MISSION; IN THE SAME CON-  
TEXT, TO TAKE EVERY STEP WITHIN THE LIMITS OF US LAW TO STOP

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HARASSMENT OF SOVIET PERSONNEL IN THE US; AND TO MOVE FORWARD TO OPEN IN KIEV AND INITIATE DISCUSSION OF THE LOCATION OF THE THIRD SET OF CONSULTATES GENERAL.

OUTSIDE THE TRADITIONAL REPERTOIRE:

--TO MAKE THE REGIONAL APPROACH A CORNERSTONE OF OUR OVERALL APPROACH TO THE USSR, ON THE PORTGUESE MODEL.

SPECIFICALLY:

---IN EAST ASIA, WE SHOULD REMAIN AWARE THAT PROGRESS IN US-PRC RELATIONS IN EAST ASIA IS OUR BEST LEVER ON SOVIET BEHAVIOR, AND IS LIKELY TO IMPROVE RATHER THAN DEGRADE THE US-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP;

---IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WE SHOULD REMAIN AWARE THAT THE SOVIETS MUST BE INCLUDED IN ANY SETTLEMENT LIKELY TO LAST;

---IN EUROPE, WE SHOULD GIVE CLOSE ATTENTION TO THE POSSIBILITY OF CHANNELLING BREZHNEV'S PROPOSAL FOR POST-CSCE BASKET II-TYPE CONFERENCE INTO BALKAN AND BALTIC REGIONAL CONTEXTS;

---IN AFRICA, AND ESPECIALLY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, WE SHOULD SEEK TO DEVELOP THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE POSITIONS IN LOCAL AND REGIONAL TERMS;

---IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, WE SHOULD CALL THE SOVIET'S BASES BLUFF BY A CLEAR FORMAL OFFER TO DISCUSS SHIP DEPLOYMENT LIMITATIONS;

---IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO DEMONSTRATE OUT INTENTION TO REMAIN INVOLVED, AND TAKE A POSITIVE APPROACH TO EFFORTS BY ASEAN MEMBERS TO MAKE ASEAN A VEHICLE FOR CONSTRUCTIVE REGIONAL RELATIONSHIPS.

--WE SHOULD EXPAND THE PRACTICE OF US-SOVIET SENIOR WORKING-LEVEL DISCUSSION OF TOPICS BEYOND THE TRADITIONAL OR ACTIVE AGENDA, TO GAIN INSIGHT INTO SOVIET THINKING AND EVEN TO MOVE IT IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION AT LOW COST.

9. DEPARTMENT REPEAT AS DESIRED.

STOESSEL

SECRET

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** POLICIES, INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS, ANNUAL REPORTS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 12 APR 1976  
**Decaption Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** ShawDG  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
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**Document Number:** 1976MOSCOW05633  
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**Errors:** N/A  
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**Previous Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** ShawDG  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 16 APR 2004  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <16 APR 2004 by CollinP0>; APPROVED <02 SEP 2004 by ShawDG>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
04 MAY 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** ANNUAL POLICY ASSESSMENT: USSR  
**TAGS:** PFOR, PARM, UR, US  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006